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Our lives are such that we cannot always avoidwrongdoing, both our own and that of others. Wefind ourselves in situations in which, through no
fault of our own, we are in a predicament, for there seems to
be little or nothing we can do “for the best.” We may have to
conduct ourselves in ways that, although not as we would
have liked, leave us with a sense of regret. One such situation
of quandary is that of the bystander to crime. He or she
appears compromised by virtue of presence at the fact of the
offence. If the decision is for action, what must he or she do?
If instead the decision is for non-intervention, is the omission
to act regrettable and, if so, is it culpable? This article
considers the situation of the bystander who is present during
the commission of a serious violent or sexual crime, but does
not intervene to oppose it. The article raises some questions
about the predicament of this bystander and poses some lines
of thought upon them.
Common usage takes the bystander to be a non-
participant spectator, one who is present at an event, but
takes no part in it, as follows: “One who is standing by; one
who is present without taking part in what is going on; a
passive spectator” (Oxford English Dictionary).
However, the position of the bystander to crime is a
difficult one that gives rise to some ambiguity. According to
some this very presence at the scene of an unfolding crime
implicates the bystander in the offence. It is the inaction of
the “passive spectator”, it is said, that renders them partly
responsible for the crime. Some have argued that the
decision not to intervene, and thus to allow the crime to
happen, is a form of complicity. Such was the view of Tunc,
who had the following to say:
“From a philosophical point of view, it does not appear
possible to distinguish between the man who does something
and the man who allows something to be done, when he can
interfere… A stone does not bear any liability if a murder is
committed beside it; a man does. By his decision not to
interfere or to intervene, he participates in the murder” (Tunc
1981: 46).
A person is indeed not a stone; it would be
uncontentious to hold that more can be required of him or
her. But in what sense does the bystander, by choosing not
to intervene, participate in the crime? Can we say that their
having allowed the crime to happen inculpates them in it in
a way that makes them complicit? We may rather think that
to stand idly by as a crime takes place is to be guilty of a
regrettable and sometimes culpable omission, though it
does not produce complicity in the actual offence.
To say that the omission to act is regrettable, is not to say
that in every case the bystander’s conduct was culpable.
This is because the bystander, although he or she would
have done otherwise, may sometimes not have been able to
do so. In such a case, we might think that the bystander is
properly one who should feel regret over what happened,
and over having been connected in some way with its
occurrence. We may feel sorry for this bystander, and offer
consolation rather than reproach. On the other hand, to
hold a bystander fully accountable for a culpable omission
is to say that this conduct was inexcusable. Even though he
or she may not be the direct cause of the crime, as a
bystander who could have done something to oppose it and
didn’t, we may deem the omission more than regrettable.
The bystander may answer us by saying “it wasn’t down to
me” and “it was nothing to do with me,” which are not
quite the same thing. If he or she claims to be untroubled
by regret, we may find this galling. To say one has no regrets
is to not accept one’s part in something as regrettable.
Thus if the bystander says of the victim “she was nothing to
me and there was no reason for me to get involved”, and
“why should I lose sleep over someone else’s problem”, we
may be indignant. We may find the bystander at fault,
thinking that there was a good, and indeed compelling
reason to have done otherwise and the possibility, however
difficult, so to do.
IF ONLY…
Regret is that feeling in which one wishes that a state of
affairs had been otherwise. “How much better if it had
been otherwise”: this is the constitutive thought of regret
in Bernard Williams’ (1981) “Moral Luck”. In this classic
essay, Williams considers the phenomenon of moral luck,
which obtains wherever the moral evaluation of a person,
whether for praise or blame, is affected by circumstances
beyond that person’s control. In the course of doing so, he
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makes an important distinction between agent-regret and
spectator’s regret. Agent-regret is the first-personal kind of
regret felt by one who considers themself connected with a
regrettable state of affairs having happened. The following
is the salient part of what Williams has to say about this
special kind of regret:
“there is a particularly important species of regret, which I
shall call ‘agent-regret’, which a person can feel only towards
his own past actions (or, at most, actions in which he regards
himself as a participant). In this case, the supposed possible
difference is that one might have acted otherwise, and the
focus of the regret is on that possibility, the thought being
formed in part by first-personal conceptions of how one might
have acted otherwise… The sentiment of agent-regret is by
no means restricted to voluntary agency. It can extend far
beyond what one intentionally did to almost anything for
which one was causally responsible in virtue of something one
intentionally did. Yet even at deeply accidental or non-
voluntary levels of agency, sentiments of agent-regret are
different from regret in general such as might be felt by a
spectator, and are acknowledged in our practices as being
different. The lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs
over a child, will feel differently from any spectator… even a
spectator next to him in the cab, except, perhaps to the extent
that the spectator takes on the thought that he himself might
have prevented it, an agent’s thought.” (Williams 1981:
27–28).
Williams assimilates spectator regret to general regret,
the regret that might be felt by any unconnected individual
who comes to hear of a regrettable state of affairs. He
contrasts this with agent-regret. Yet Williams also
recognizes an intermediate kind of regret, which I shall call
“passenger regret.” In Williams’ example the passenger,
who is along for the ride but not directing the vehicle, may
feel regret over the perceived possibility of having been able
to prevent the accident. It is possible to delineate yet
another form, which may be called “bystander regret.” The
regret of both passenger and bystander is special rather
than merely general, first-personal and agentic, although
not quite the same as agent-regret itself.
In Williams’ terms, the lorry driver is “causally
responsible” for the injury in virtue of having been driving
the lorry at the moment of collision. The special kind of
regret felt by the driver issues from his unique contribution
as direct causal agent. Even though the causal conduct itself
is faultless, it is nevertheless the direct cause of the injury.
Given that this is the case, whilst the injurious agency of
the driver is “deeply accidental,” we would not think his
regret unreasonable. Our bystander to crime is not a direct
cause in this way, indeed the direct cause of the injury to
the crime victim lies with the agency of the perpetrator.
Further, there is the question of intention. The lorry driver
has no time for deliberation; he has no opportunity to do
otherwise than run over the child. He is not in a quandary;
due to the suddenness and unforseeability of the accident,
he does not have the chance to decide upon what might be
for the best.
The situation of the bystander to crime is different. He
or she must decide, and decide quickly moreover, what if
anything to do. One thing that the driver and the bystander
have in common is that neither of them wants to cause
injury. Despite this they are both involved, albeit in
different ways, with the injurious event having happened.
Williams (1981: 20) holds that “what is not in the domain
of the self is not in its control, and so is subject to luck.” A
comprehensive treatment of the bystander problem
requires an account of agency, contingency and autonomy
that cannot be developed here. Nevertheless, some
elements of such an account can be indicatively presented.
The quandary of the bystander involves what Scheffler
(2004: 225) calls the responsibilities of causal position, in
this case, “opportunities to intervene in causal processes
we did not initiate, and which may be quite alien to our
purposes.” Recall that Williams allows that the regret of a
spectator who thinks they may have prevented a regrettable
state of affairs is agentic. That is not to say that it is agent-
regret per se. This is a point of importance. One way of
considering it is to think about primary and secondary
manifestations of agency. Scheffler holds that failing to
prevent someone from being harmed is a secondary
manifestation of one’s agency, and is thus something for
which one is less responsible than those primary
manifestations that are harms done to others. This holds
true, Scheffler says, even when the harm to the other that
one fails to prevent comes about due to the agency of
another. Nevertheless this does not provide, he adds, that
no responsibility whatsoever attaches to the conduct of one
who fails to prevent a harm coming about:
“If one is in a position to prevent some disastrous chain of
events from unfolding and does not do so, then the fact that
one did not initiate the chain or make a direct causal
contribution to it cannot be relied upon to provide one with
an automatic justification or excuse. The norms of individual
responsibility attach some weight to what we fail to prevent”
(Scheffler 2004: 225).
Thinking about the predicament of the bystander to
crime, we must consider whether there is a way in which
this person is answerable for the wrong that he or she has
allowed to be done by the other. We ought to note the gravity
of the regrettable state of affairs that has come about, and
maintain a careful line of thought on exculpatory and
justificatory conditions.
PRESENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTION
Consider one who is a bystander to crime, present “at
the fact.” Here, immediacy to the occurrence of the
criminal act suggests a connection of some kind. By virtue
of being “there”, the crime event is something with which
the bystander is directly confronted. Ordinarily this close
proximity should provide that there is specific knowledge, 3





that is, that the bystander is cognizant of the actual crime
in progress. The question then becomes whether intent in
this instance is a purposeful omission, a deliberate
forbearance, a choice not to do some given act. To do
nothing, one might say, is not necessarily to choose not to
do any particular thing. In the moment that just passed I
was not walking with lama in the Himalayas. Neither was I
on the common walking my dog. This was not because I
had chosen not to do these things. Rather it had not
actually occurred to me at that moment to do them. The
first of them, unprompted, would very likely never have
occurred to me as something I would do. In bystander, this
is not a case of something one doesn’t do because it has not
arisen as a likely course of conduct for one at that moment,
as something one might do or must do, there and then.
In bystanding conduct, the omission is an omission to
do something that can be presumed to have come to the
bystander’s attention, to have become a pressing matter of
deliberation. This is a situation of emergency, a dangerous
state of affairs which happens suddenly and unexpectedly,
and needs immediate action in order to avoid harmful
results. It is also an emergency occasioned by the culpable,
that is deliberate and faulty, conduct of another. Witnessing
criminal injury is simply not something that is of no
concern to the “decent” moral agent. It is not, as both
immediate to one and what one might call dramatic,
something that one does not notice, that does not become
a “deliberative priority” (Williams 1985/1993: 186).
The bystander to crime, as a “passive spectator” is there
looking on, seeing the commission of the crime, and
presumably knowing it is a crime that is being seen. He or
she, as a bystander, is a knowing spectator. It falls to the
bystander to have to decide whether and how to act, simply
because they are there. This is particularly and most clearly
the case when there is only one bystander. Sometimes
though there may be several onlookers and, indeed, a
crowd. Where there is only one bystander, it especially falls
to that person to have to decide what to do, for they are the
only one there. Here, one might say, the quandary is
heightened, for I alone can act to intervene. But, it doesn’t
follow that I need do nothing if there are others there with
me. It falls to each and all to decide what to do. That said,
some may consider themselves, and be considered, in a
better position to do something than the others.
PRESENCE AND COMPLICITY
Recall that Williams identified as agentic the regret of
one who considers themself a participant in the occurrence
of a regrettable state of affairs. In fact he appears to
associate the participant with agent-regret itself. In the
bystander to crime case, complicitous conduct is more
than regrettable; it is culpable and indeed criminally liable,
for in complicity one intentionally participates in the
wrong of another. The genuine bystander would not
ordinarily be deemed complicit in the crime. What kind of
conduct need the bystander contribute in order to be
complicit? The key to this question resides with the notion
of participatory intention, which Kutz (2000: 11) glosses
as “a distinctive, individual, instrumental, intention to play
one’s part in joint act.”
How does this kind of intention bear upon the
culpability of the bystander to crime? Take the principle
that mere presence during the commission of a crime is
relevant but insufficient to establish complicity. This
provides that one does not become a party to another’s
criminal conduct by merely being present when the crime
that he or she commits occurs. It is necessary that the
bystander be a “deliberate supporter” (R v Bailey [2004]
EWCA Crim 2169). Merely standing by, even if by choice
and with direct knowledge that the crime is taking place,
does not of itself make a person party to the crime. The
bystander’s presence may in fact encourage the
perpetrator, and moreover he may know that his mere
presence works to so encourage. However, unless the
person intends his presence to be an encouragement to the
commission of the crime, he is not complicit. All this is not
to say that presence is irrelevant though, for it may be a fact
in drawing the inference of intentional encouragement.
Presence by prior arrangement is strong material
supporting the inference. In such a situation, presence is
not accidental, for instance the person has chosen to be
present at a crime (an illegal event, say) of which he or she
had advance knowledge. This is not an accidental
bystander, who just happened by at the moment when a
crime took place, and thus presence can suggest approval
of the offence.
What of the bystander who does happen upon the
criminal event? He or she suddenly is in a situation of
being an onlooker to a crime. There has been no prior
arrangement, no advance knowledge. This person is
inadvertently present, as an accidental spectator to a crime,
having chanced upon the crime event. Is the bystander then
involuntarily present, an unwilling spectator who is not
assenting to the crime? The accidental character of
presence does not of itself guarantee that the spectator is
an unwilling onlooker to a crime that he or she does not
want to happen. However, for complicity the subsequent
conduct would then have to intentionally encourage the
principal. In what respects may the bystander’s inaction
suggest a desire that the offence come about? There is the
idea that the failure to oppose the crime is conduct
amounting to encouraging commission of it. It has been
suggested that failing to aid the victim translates innocent
bystanding into a form of complicity, for instance by
Stewart (1998: 414–5). The idea here is that witnessing
criminally caused injury creates a legitimate expectation of
intervention. The subsequent failure to do anything at all
to assist the victim looks bad, but only suggests complicity
where there is intentional encouragement of the
perpetrator.
Intentional encouragement of the crime is not only
associated with failure to assist the victim. Indeed failure to4
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oppose the commission of the crime may be relevant to the
inference that one encouraged it. Presence at the scene of
the crime without dissociating oneself from it, that is,
without overt rejection of any purpose to assist in the
commission of the crime, may evidence intentional
encouragement (R v Coney and others [1882] 8 QBD 534).
Being voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the
commission of a crime, offering no opposition or dissent,
suggests that the bystander wilfully encouraged and so
aided and abetted. So, omissive conduct can be deemed
intentional encouragement, but this is not likely in the case
of accidental presence. The apathetic bystander is not
complicit then, but is this conduct regrettable, and is it
culpable? Smith (1991: 38) envisages a general entitlement
of the individual to not have to get involved in preventing
an offence accidentally witnessed, because this would
create a hazardous duty on one faced with the dilemma
through no fault of their own. This will not serve as an
answer to our problem, for it does not recognise the
bystander’s situation to be one of quandary. The bystander
is accidentally present and then may face threatening
behaviour from the perpetrator. This is most unlucky, in
Nagel’s (1979) sense of circumstantial luck, the luck of the
“kind of problems and situations one faces.” This ill luck,
however, does not necessarily negative any reason to
intervene, or possibility to do so.
THE CULPABLE AND THE EXCUSABLE
The bystander may say “I had to do as I did,” or, “I knew
not what I did.” In some circumstances where this is
genuinely the case, we might consider the omission
regrettable but excusable. Recall what I had to say above
about presence, knowledge and intention. There may be
excusable ignorance. A genuine mistake of fact, that is, a
substantially incomplete or faulty knowledge of what one is
witnessing, may provide an excuse. The excuse only works
however, if one is not at fault for the ignorance from which
the conduct arises. Compulsion to inaction by threats may
also provide an excuse. Consider the following scenario.
The perpetrator points a gun at the head of the bystander
and says “Stay out of it or else I will shoot you.” This
instruction that the bystander offer no opposition to the
crime, it might be said, is a conditional threat that would
render his or her subsequent failure to intervene not freely
chosen and hence not culpable. Nevertheless, not every
kind of threat can be taken to remove the agent’s ability to
act freely. In coercion there is a command that a person do
or refrain from doing an act, or else an undesirable
outcome will be visited upon them. Here Nozick’s
(1969/1997) seven conditions for coercion are suggestive,
in which he describes a scenario of coercion into an
omission:
Person R coerces person E into not doing A if and only if:
1. R threatens to bring about or have brought about some
consequence if E does A (and knows he is threatening
to do this).
2. A with this threatened consequence is rendered
substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for E
than A was without the threatened consequence.
3. R makes this threat in order to get E not to do A,
intending that E realize he’s been threatened by R.
4. E does not do A.
5. Part of E’s reason for not doing A is to avoid (or lessen
the likelihood of) the consequence which R has
threatened to bring about or have brought about.
6. E knows that R has threatened to do the something
mentioned in 1., if he, E, does A.
7. E believes that and R believes that E believes that, R’s
threatened consequence would leave E worse off,
having done A, than if E didn’t do A and R didn’t bring
about the consequence.
Central to Nozick’s account is the condition that the
coercer communicates a credible threat. Simply seeing a
person committing a crime against another person does
not ipso facto communicate a threat to the bystander.
Merely being an onlooker to a crime, where the
perpetrator does not address the bystander at all, materially
differs from Nozick’s conditions. Here, a threat has not
been directly communicated. Anyway, whether the threat is
directly communicated or only tacit it may not defeat the
ability to act freely. In the coercion scenario, conduct
becomes “less eligible.” It is not actually made impossible,
but is made less appealing to the coerced person. Even if
there was threat, this only limits the person’s prospects for
action. It does not mean that he or she can only do
nothing. Threat alone can not suffice to vitiate the ability to
act freely. Indeed, according to Frankfurt (1973), threats
can be effective but not coercive. This is the case because
threats are only coercive when victims are incapable of
defying them. Coercion violates its victim’s autonomy only
as “necessarily either moved in some way against his will or
his will is in some way circumvented” (Frankfurt 1973:
80). Thus the bystander who is frozen by fear is coerced.
The subsequent omission would be regrettable and
reasonably leave the bystander regretful, but would be
excusable. Here the omission remains wrongful, but in
exculpation there is the idea that the bystander’s
predicament is understandably difficult and, although the
omission is not justifiable, it is in this instance excusable.
This is not a simple matter of exoneration however; indeed
as Austin (1956-7/1961: 125) succinctly puts it, “few
excuses get us out of it completely.”
The bystander is unlucky. He is accidentally present at
the fact. This is not a kind of ill luck that renders
subsequent omissive conduct beyond his control. Even
where there are threats from the perpetrator, this may not
remove all possibility of any kind of intervention from the
bystander. Where the bystander tries to intervene we might
say that it was a good thing that he or she was there, and
especially if the crime is successfully thwarted, but in any 5





case we would not likely say he or she was lucky to have
been there.
TRYING AND ALLOWING
Recall the agentic regret of the passenger in the lorry,
who supposes he or she might have prevented the accident.
This person has failed to prevent the regrettable state of
affairs, but we would hardly say that he or she allowed it to
happen. The same cannot be said of the bystander to
crime, who ordinarily does have the time for deliberation
and the possibility to make some kind of intervention.
What do we mean when we say that the bystander’s
omissive conduct allowed the crime to happen? You let X
happen if and only if you refrain from causally preventing
X from happening. If not-letting-happen requires causally
preventing the crime from taking place, need the
intervention be successful?
The answer is surely no. In this case, where the
bystander has done nothing, what is counterposed to
refraining is not succeeding in thwarting the crime’s
occurrence, but trying to do so. A genuine try is an
attempt to intervene that one does despite the uncertainty
of outcome. A failure to actually achieve thwarting the
crime may be regrettable and leave one regretful. But a
genuine, albeit unsuccessful, attempt would diminish
culpability in a significant way. What kind of trying
intervention would do? To intervene is to involve oneself in
a situation so as to alter or hinder an action or
development. Mere dissociation does not seem adequate.
To look away, or walk away, might signal dissociation from
the crime, but not do enough to substantially alter or
hinder its course. Conduct that might alter or hinder the
crime’s coming about could include aiding the victim,
shouting for help, making a citizen’s arrest, or summoning
the police. In this way, where one does what one can to
oppose and hopefully alter the course of action such that
one might succeed in thwarting the crime, it is to cast off
complicity. It is also to avoid the charge of a culpable
omission. Where the attempted intervention fails, the
bystander may still regret that he or she did not do enough,
or did not do the right thing, to successfully thwart the
crime. But at least the bystander has done something and
would hence not likely be spoken of as one who allowed
the crime to happen.
CONCLUSIONS
As I have sketched it, the situation of the bystander to
crime is indeed a predicament. It has been argued that the
genuine bystander is not complicit in the crime witnessed,
absent the requisite kind of participatory intention. This
person may, however, be responsible for a regrettable and
sometimes culpable omission. I have ventured that the
agent who is responsive to moral reasons can recognise
sufficiently compelling reasons to try to intervene to
oppose the crime. The bystander who intervened, even if
in vain, can think ‘at least I tried.’
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